Eudaimonia

Eudaimonía (griego: εὐδαιμονία /eu̯dai̯moníaː/) es un término griego comúnmente traducido como felicidad, bienestar o vida buena; también se ha propuesto «florecimiento humano» o «prosperidad» como su traducción más precisa.

Etimológicamente, se compone de las palabras «eu» («bueno») y «daimōn» («espíritu»). Es un concepto central en la ética y la filosofía política griega clásica, junto con los términos «aretē», la «virtud» o «excelencia», y «phronesis», a menudo traducido como «sabiduría práctica o ética».^[1] En las obras de Aristóteles, la eudaimonía designa el mayor bienestar humano. La consecución de éste, sería el objetivo de la filosofía práctica, que da lugar a un proyecto filosófico que busca investigar (y también experimentar) qué es realmente, y cómo puede lograrse.

La discusión sobre el vínculo entre la virtud del carácter (ēthikē aretē) y la felicidad (eudaimonía) es una de las preocupaciones centrales de la ética antigua y un tema de muchos desacuerdos. Como resultado hay muchas variedades de eudaimonismo. Dos de las formas más influyentes son las de Aristóteles y los estoicos.^[2] Aristóteles considera que la virtud y su práctica son el componente más importante de la eudaimonía, pero también reconoce la importancia de los bienes externos como la salud, la riqueza y la belleza. En contraste, los estoicos (estoicismo antiguo) consideran a la virtud como necesaria y suficiente para la eudaimonía y por lo tanto niegan la necesidad de bienes externos.^[3]

↑ Rosalind Hursthouse (18 de julio de 2007). «Virtue Ethics». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «But although modern virtue ethics does not have to take the form known as «neo-Aristotelian», almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are areté (excellence or virtue) phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing.) As modern virtue ethics has grown and more people have become familiar with its literature, the understanding of these terms has increased, but it is still the case that readers familiar only with modern philosophy tend to misinterpret them.»
↑ Verena von Pfetten (4 de septiembre de 2008). «5 Things Happy People Do». Huffington Post. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «But researchers now believe that eudaimonic well-being may be more important. Cobbled from the Greek eu («good») and daimon («spirit» or «deity»), eudaimonia means striving toward excellence based on one's unique talents and potential—Aristotle considered it to be the noblest goal in life. In his time, the Greeks believed that each child was blessed at birth with a personal daimon embodying the highest possible expression of his or her nature. One way they envisioned the daimon was as a golden figurine that would be revealed by cracking away an outer layer of cheap pottery (the person's baser exterior). The effort to know and realize one's most golden self—«personal growth,» in today's vernacular—is now the central concept of eudaimonia, which has also come to include continually taking on new challenges and fulfilling one's sense of purpose in life.»
↑ Klein, Jacob (2012). Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: From Plato to Spinoza. OUP USA. pp. 63-64. ISBN 9780199767175. LCCN 2012001316. «According to Irwin, the Stoic thesis that loss and tragedy do not affect an agent's welfare does not imply that a rational agent has no reason to regret such a loss, for on Irwin's account of Stoic theory the life of virtue and happiness and the life that accords with nature constitute independently rational aims... A number of considerations tell against this interpretation, however. One such consideration is merely an ex silentio appeal. No Stoic source, to my knowledge, suggests that actions may be justified with respect to anything other than what contributes to the end of happiness, and virtue alone does this in the Stoics view. A few texts, moreover, are explicit on this point. Cicero's summary of Stoics' ethics in De finibus 3 considers and rejects the suggestion that Stoic theory is implicitly committed to two final ends, virtue and a life that accords with nature, where these are conceived as independent objectives at which a rational agent might aim... Independent, that is, in the strong sense according to which one of these rational objectives may be realized while the other is not. See Irwin (2007), p. 316: 'Virtuous action. therefore, is not sufficient for achieving the life according to nature, which includes the natural advantages.' Irwin is certainly correct to point out that virtue is not sufficient for attaining the natural advantages, preferred indifferents such as health and wealth. But it is the Stoics' critics, not the Stoics themselves, who maintain that the actual possession of these items is a necessary condition of the life according to nature.»

[«twsJun5e»-1] Rosalind Hursthouse (18 de julio de 2007). «Virtue Ethics». Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «But although modern virtue ethics does not have to take the form known as «neo-Aristotelian», almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are areté (excellence or virtue) phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing.) As modern virtue ethics has grown and more people have become familiar with its literature, the understanding of these terms has increased, but it is still the case that readers familiar only with modern philosophy tend to misinterpret them.»

[«twsJun5a»-2] Verena von Pfetten (4 de septiembre de 2008). «5 Things Happy People Do». Huffington Post. Consultado el 5 de junio de 2010. «But researchers now believe that eudaimonic well-being may be more important. Cobbled from the Greek eu («good») and daimon («spirit» or «deity»), eudaimonia means striving toward excellence based on one's unique talents and potential—Aristotle considered it to be the noblest goal in life. In his time, the Greeks believed that each child was blessed at birth with a personal daimon embodying the highest possible expression of his or her nature. One way they envisioned the daimon was as a golden figurine that would be revealed by cracking away an outer layer of cheap pottery (the person's baser exterior). The effort to know and realize one's most golden self—«personal growth,» in today's vernacular—is now the central concept of eudaimonia, which has also come to include continually taking on new challenges and fulfilling one's sense of purpose in life.»

[«Klein2012»-3] Klein, Jacob (2012). Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: From Plato to Spinoza. OUP USA. pp. 63-64. ISBN 9780199767175. LCCN 2012001316. «According to Irwin, the Stoic thesis that loss and tragedy do not affect an agent's welfare does not imply that a rational agent has no reason to regret such a loss, for on Irwin's account of Stoic theory the life of virtue and happiness and the life that accords with nature constitute independently rational aims... A number of considerations tell against this interpretation, however. One such consideration is merely an ex silentio appeal. No Stoic source, to my knowledge, suggests that actions may be justified with respect to anything other than what contributes to the end of happiness, and virtue alone does this in the Stoics view. A few texts, moreover, are explicit on this point. Cicero's summary of Stoics' ethics in De finibus 3 considers and rejects the suggestion that Stoic theory is implicitly committed to two final ends, virtue and a life that accords with nature, where these are conceived as independent objectives at which a rational agent might aim... Independent, that is, in the strong sense according to which one of these rational objectives may be realized while the other is not. See Irwin (2007), p. 316: 'Virtuous action. therefore, is not sufficient for achieving the life according to nature, which includes the natural advantages.' Irwin is certainly correct to point out that virtue is not sufficient for attaining the natural advantages, preferred indifferents such as health and wealth. But it is the Stoics' critics, not the Stoics themselves, who maintain that the actual possession of these items is a necessary condition of the life according to nature.»

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