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1988 Hamas charter
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The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Arabic: ميثاق حركة المقاومة الإسلامية حماس), referred to as the Hamas Covenant or Hamas Charter, was issued by Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) on 18 August 1988 and outlines the organization's founding identity, positions, and aims.[1] In 2017, Hamas unveiled a revised charter, without explicitly revoking the 1988 charter.[2][3]
The original Charter identified Hamas as the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and described its members to be god-fearing Muslims raising the banner of Jihad (armed struggle) in "the face of the oppressors." The charter defines the struggle to be against the Jews and calls for the eventual creation of an Islamic Palestinian state in all of former Mandatory Palestine, and the obliteration or dissolution of Israel.[4][5][6] The charter has been criticized for its use of antisemitic language,[7][8] which some commentators have characterized as incitement to genocide.[9][10] Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and clarified Hamas's struggle is with Zionists, not Jews.[11]
Since choosing to run candidates for office in elections, Hamas has downplayed the role of its charter.[12] In direct contradiction of the Charter, in 2008 Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh stated that Hamas would agree to accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, and to offer a long-term truce with Israel.[13] In 2010, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal stated that the Charter is "a piece of history and no longer relevant, but cannot be changed for internal reasons".[14] Meshaal also stated that Hamas was ending its association with the Muslim Brotherhood.[15] The 2017 charter accepts a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, though it maintains Hamas's refusal to recognize Israel.[16]
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
avalonwas invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Tamara Qiblawi; Angela Dewan; Larry Register (1 May 2017). "Hamas says it accepts '67 borders, but doesn't recognize Israel". CNN. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 3 May 2017.
- ^ Brenner, Bjorn (30 November 2021). Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 205–207. ISBN 978-0-7556-3439-2.
Still leaving some room for question, Hamas had stopped short of formally renouncing the old charter. Being asked about why, several Hamas leaders nevertheless responded affirmatively that 'The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past.'
- ^ Myre, Greg (27 February 2006). "Israeli Official Says Hamas Has Made Abbas Irrelevant". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 27 April 2020. Retrieved 26 December 2023.
- ^ "The Covenant of the HAMAS - Main Points". Intelligence Resource Project. Federation of American Scientists. Archived from the original on 8 December 2015. Retrieved 2 May 2017.
- ^ The Palestinian Hamas By Shaul Mishal, Avraham Sela. Google Books. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
- ^ May, Tiffany (8 October 2023). "A Quick Look at Hamas". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 14 October 2023. Retrieved 9 October 2023.
- ^ "Have war crimes been committed in Israel and Gaza and what laws govern the conflict?". CNN. 16 November 2023. Archived from the original on 16 November 2023. Retrieved 18 November 2023.
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
Gourevitchwas invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Cite error: The named reference
Goldbergwas invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Multiple sources:
- Seurat, Leila (2019). The Foreign Policy of Hamas. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 17. ISBN 9781838607449.
- Amira, Hass (3 May 2017). "Why Hamas' New Charter Is Aimed at Palestinians, Not Israelis". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 23 April 2023. Retrieved 12 November 2024.
- Qossay Hamed (2023). Hamas in Power: The Question of Transformation. IGI Global. p. 161.
- Timea Spitka (2023). National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Springer International Publishing. p. 88-89.
- "Khaled Meshaal: Struggle is against Israel, not Jews". Al-Jazeera. 6 May 2017. Archived from the original on 19 November 2023. Retrieved 19 November 2023.
- Patrick Wintour (2 May 2017). "Hamas presents new charter accepting a Palestine based on 1967 borders". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 14 April 2019. Retrieved 3 May 2017.
- ^ Hroub, Khaled (2006). "A "New Hamas" through Its New Documents". Journal of Palestine Studies. 35 (1 (Summer 2006)): 6–27. doi:10.1525/jps.2006.35.4.6. Archived from the original on 18 September 2008.
Since Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, its political positions as presented in the Western media hark back to its 1988 charter, with almost no reference to its considerable evolution under the impact of political developments. …From its establishment, Hamas had steadfastly refused to run in any national elections, either for PC or for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA). As both these structures grew out of the Oslo accords, which Hamas opposed and considered illegitimate, it had never recognized the legitimacy of either. Thus, whereas the movement has long participated in municipal and other local elections, making its growing strength quantifiable, the question of whether to enter national electoral politics was a difficult decision, fraught with the contradictions that could be expected in a movement whose leadership is geographically divided between the "inside" and the "outside," whose political and military wings have a degree of autonomy, and which adopts a democratic decision-making process with a diversity of views. … Despite the oft-repeated rhetoric of Hamas's leaders that their movement will remain faithful to its known principles, the three documents reveal beyond question that the demands of the national arena have driven Hamas in dramatically new directions…Hamas continues to be characterized with reference to its 1988 charter, drawn up less than a year after the movement was established in direct response to the outbreak of the first intifada and when its raison d'être was armed resistance to the occupation. … Given Hamas's traditional projection of itself as an uncompromising resistance movement, and the popularity it has derived from its resistance to the Israeli occupation, its choice of "change and reform" as the theme of its campaign and name of its electoral list…draws attention to the failure and corruption associated with its rival Fatah. … Without doubt, there are many who remain highly skeptical of Hamas's new face, suspecting a ploy to gain power by concealing true agendas. … This leaves open the question of whether Hamas in power will be able to function practically within the parameters of the peace process as originally agreed to by Israel and the PLO at Oslo, which Hamas had vehemently opposed.
- ^ "Haniyeh: Hamas willing to accept Palestinian state with 1967 borders Archived 10 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine". Haaretz. (09-11-08) Retrieved 27 May 2011.
- ^ Mazin Qumsiyeh on the History and Practice Of Nonviolent Palestinian Resistance Archived 5 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May–June 2010, pp. 40-42.
- ^ Nidal al-Mughrabi; Tom Finn (2 May 2017). "Hamas softens stance on Israel, drops Muslim Brotherhood link". Reuters. Archived from the original on 11 May 2019. Retrieved 3 May 2017.
- ^ Hroub, Khaled (2017). "A Newer Hamas? The Revised Charter". Journal of Palestine Studies. 46 (4): 100–111. doi:10.1525/jps.2017.46.4.100.
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