Defence of the Reich | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Western Front of World War II | |||||||
The Heligoland Bight | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
United Kingdom | Germany | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Richard Kellett | C.A. Schumacher | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
No. 9 Squadron RAF No. 37 Squadron RAF No. 149 Squadron RAF |
Stab./Jagdgeschwader 1 II./Jagdgeschwader 77 II./Trägergruppe 186 (N)./Jagdgeschwader 26 I./Zerstörergeschwader 76 I./Jagdgeschwader 26 | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
22 Vickers Wellington bombers | 44 fighter aircraft[4] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
12 bombers destroyed 3 bombers damaged 57 killed[5] |
2 Bf 109s destroyed[4] 30 sailors injured |
The Battle of the Heligoland Bight[6][7] was the first "named" air battle of the Second World War, which began the longest air campaign of the war on 3 September 1939, the Defence of the Reich.[8] After the declaration of war, RAF Bomber Command began operations against Nazi Germany but limited their attacks to those targets that were purely military and had little risk of civilian casualties. This largely limited their efforts to attacks on the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) warships in German ports to prevent their use in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Early operations led the RAF to conclude that fighter aircraft were not a serious threat against modern bombers. They were also marked by a lack of coordination and minor issues like bad weather and communication problems that meant none of these early operations was very intense. The RAF implemented changes to ensure more aircraft could be launched more rapidly to make up for these issues.
On 18 December 1939, a force of three squadrons was launched against capital ships anchored in the Wilhelmshaven area. Originally 24 Vickers Wellingtons took off, but two turned back due to engine trouble before reaching German airspace. The German reaction was slow, but eventually between 80 and 120 fighter aircraft were launched, although only 44 made contact with the British bombers.[4] Of the 22 bombers that reached the target area, the Luftwaffe shot down 12, over half the force.
The battle had a huge influence on both sides' strategies. It led the RAF to abandon daylight missions in favour of night bombing as daytime casualties were too high.[9] In contrast, the failure of the raid led the Luftwaffe to believe Germany proper was invulnerable to enemy attack. This belief was reinforced by the success of the Battle of France, which meant that opposing air forces were pushed too far away for effective bombing attacks on the German homeland.
The Germans' neglect of their day fighter force had serious strategic consequences in later years. By the time they began reorganising defences to combat continued RAF raids and also the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) strategic bombing campaign, they were already engaged in a war of attrition for which they were not prepared. This oversight was one of the contributing factors in the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Defence of the Reich campaign. The Battle of the Heligoland Bight was later described as "amongst the most important actions of the entire war".[8]