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Bergmann Offensive

Bergmann Offensive

The limit of the Russian advance into Anatolia during the Caucasus Campaign (1914–1918)
Date2–21 November 1914
Location
Result Ottoman victory
Belligerents
 Ottoman Empire
 German Empire
Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Ottoman Empire Enver Pasha
Ottoman Empire Galip Pasha
Felix Guse
Ottoman Empire Yusuf İzzet Pasha
Ottoman Empire Ali İhsan Pasha
Ottoman Empire Şerif Bey
Ottoman Empire Arif Bey
Ottoman Empire Ziya Bey
Ottoman Empire Behaeddin Shakir
Ottoman Empire Yakub Cemil
I. Vorontsov-Dashkov
Georgy Bergmann
Nikolai Yudenich
Nikolai Baratov
Nikolai Istomin
Strength

96,000[1]
or 90,000 & 152 guns[2]

  • IX Corps (3 division): 50,000 soldiers & 72 guns[2]
  • XI Corps (3 division): 35,000 soldiers & 60 guns[2]
  • 37th Division: 5,000 soldiers & 20 guns[2]
  • Turks had also 40,000 irregular Hamidiye cavalry[3]

75,000 & 168 guns[4]

  • 1st Caucasian Army Corps (32 battalions): 40-42,000 infantry & 96 guns[4]
  • 1st Caucasian Cossack Division (30 sotnia) and one odd Cossack regiment (6 sotnia): 4,500 cavalry & 24 guns[4]
  • 1st Kuban Plastun Brigade (5 battalions): 3,500 infantry[4]
  • Armenian volunteers (4 druzhina): 4,000 infantry[4]
  • 2st Kuban Plastun Brigade (6 battalions): 4,000 infantry
  • General Reserve: 2nd Turkistan Army Corps (21 battalions, 12 sotnia); 17,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 48 guns [4]
Casualties and losses

12,000[5]

  • 1,983 killed[5]
  • 6,170 wounded[5]
  • 3,070 taken prisoner[5]
  • 2,800 deserted[5]

Total: 14,023


At least 20,000 deserted before battle (mostly Armenian soldiers) [3]

7,000[5]

  • 1,000 killed[5]
  • 4,000 wounded[5]
  • 1,000 died of frostbite[5]

The Bergmann Offensive (Turkish: Bergmann Taaruzu; in Turkish literature Köprüköy ve Azap Muharebeleri, "Battles of Köprüköy and Azap"; in Russian literature Кёприкейская операция—"Köprüköy operation") was the first engagement of the Caucasus Campaign. The first battle after the Russians took Bayazet during World War I.[6] General Georgy Bergmann, commander of the 1st Caucasus Army Corps, took the initiative against the Ottoman Empire.[7]

When the war started, Russia had 25 battalions at Sarikamish, 8 battalions at Oltu, 5 battalions at Kağızman and 5 battalions at Kars. Russia also had 20 cavalry companies.[8] On the other hand, the Ottomans had XI Corps' 2 divisions (18 Battalions) at Hasankale, IX Corps' 28th and 29th Divisions at Erzurum, IX Corps's 17th Division at İspir, XI Corps' 33rd Division at Tutak, 37th Division (6 battalions) at Muş, X Corps' 30th Division at Sivas, 32nd Division at Samsun and 31st Division at Amasya. X Corps didn't participate in the Bergmann Offensive due to its distance. 29th, 33rd and 37th Divisions joined the battle on 11 November and 17th Division on 17 November. The Ottomans initially had a 33% infantry numerical advantage (the Russian Caucasian Army consisted of 45,000 infantry and the Ottoman army had 60,000 infantry available) and Russia separated their army carelessly. The Ottomans however didn't use this advantage due to their precaution. Russia equalized numbers by starting to bring in the Turkistan Army Corps on 16 November. The Ottomans obtained a 50% infantry advantage by bringing X Corps (40,000 infantry) at the beginning of December.[9] This numerical superiority encouraged the Ottomans to perform the Sarikamish Offensive.

At the outbreak of war, the Russians decided to occupy the Eleşkirt valley as a defensive measure to prevent the incursion of Kurdish Hamidiye units. The Russians considered the Turkish forces to be too weak to mount any offensive before winter weather would make any such offensive impossible, and no other offensive moves were intended by the Russian high command of the Caucasian army – their strategy envisaged an active defense against a locally superior force. However, local Russian commanders had the authority to authorize limited advances.[10]

On 2 November, Bergmann's troops crossed the border in the general direction of Köprüköy. The primary aim was to secure the Eleșkirt valley. On the right flank, 20th Infantry Division under Istomin moved from Oltu in the direction of İd.[7] On the left flank a Cossack division under Baratov moved into the Eleșkirt valley towards Yuzveran, after it crossed the Aras River.[7]

By 5 November Bergmann had completed the objectives expected of him. However, he expanded his mission by ordering further advances into Ottoman territory. By 6 November contact was made between the opposing armies, and heavy fighting continued into the 7th, with temporary Russian successes. Further Russian advances were held in check as a result of heavy fighting between 7 and 10 November. On 11 November Ottoman forces counterattacked and the Russian flanks quickly became at risk, forcing a Russian retreat. By the 12th they had retreated back to the lines they occupied on the 4th, and still at risk of being outflanked, further retreats followed. Only the arrival of Russian reinforcements headed by General Przevalski checked the situation and halted the Russian retreat. On 16–17 November Przevalski crossed the Aras river and at dawn attacked part of the Turkish XI Corps, halting their advance. After two more days the fighting finally petered out.[11]

Russian losses were 1,000 killed and 4,000 wounded, 1,000 men died of exposure[5](with the Bakinski regiment suffering 40% losses), while the Ottomans lost 1,983 men killed, 6,170 wounded, 3,070 were taken prisoner, and 2,800 deserted.[5] Yudenich and his staff were disappointed by the unsuccessful attack. Turkish forces then crossed the border and, advancing into the lower Choruh valley, destroyed on 15 November a Russian column sent to protect the copper mines at Borçka, forcing the Russians to evacuate Borçka, Artvin and Ardanuç.[12] Turkish success during these first engagements encouraged Enver Pasha in his plan to attack at Sarıkamıș.[7][13]

Muratoff and Allen describe Bergman as "an officer who liked to imitate in appearance and manner the type of the old Caucasian hero-leaders", but who had "none of the qualities which are necessary as a commander; he had no experience of field operations, and was merely blindly obstinate when he thought to show strength of character".[14]

  1. ^ Rob Johnson. "The Great War and the Middle East". Oxford University. Page 156.
  2. ^ a b c d Cite error: The named reference Hafız Hakkı was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  3. ^ a b Şerif ilden (1922). Sarıkamış. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
  4. ^ a b c d e f P. Muratoff, W. E. D. Allen (1953). Caucasian Battlefields. New York: Cambridge Library Collection. p. 242.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Eugene Rogan. The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East. Hachette UK. 2015. P. 78
  6. ^ Царствование Императора Николая 2/ Сергей Ольденбург.-М.:Центрполиграф, 2022.-654 с. ISBN 978-5-227-09905-1
  7. ^ a b c d Hinterhoff, Eugene (1984). The Campaign in Armenia. Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War I, vol ii. New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation. p. 500. ISBN 0-86307-181-3.
  8. ^ General Nikolski, Sarıkamış Harekatı, p. 3.
  9. ^ Köprülülü Şerif İlden, Sarıkamış, p. 161.
  10. ^ W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields", Cambridge 1953, page 242.
  11. ^ W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields", Cambridge 1953, pages 246-247.
  12. ^ W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields", Cambridge 1953, page 248.
  13. ^ Zayonchkovskiy, A. M. (2000). Первая мировая война (Pervaya mirovaya voyna) [World War I] (in Russian). Saint-Petersburg: Poligon. p. 878. ISBN 5-89173-082-0.
  14. ^ W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields", Cambridge 1953, page 244.

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