This article includes a list of general references, but it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations. (June 2016) |
Defense of Schwedt Bridgehead | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of World War II | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Germany | Soviet Union | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Heinrich Himmler Otto Skorzeny | Konstantin Rokossovsky | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Originally a Kampfgruppe, later XI SS Panzer Corps | Deception by 2nd Guards Tank Army, supported by 61st and 49th Armies |
The defense of the Schwedt bridgehead was a German 3rd Panzer Army operation on the Eastern Front during the final months of World War II. German forces, commanded by Otto Skorzeny, were ordered to prepare to conduct a counter-offensive. However they were forced to hold a bridgehead against expected numerically superior forces of the Soviet 2nd Belorussian Front (Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky) for 31 days. Their position was largely ignored during the Red Army's Cottbus–Potsdam Offensive Operation which breached German defenses at Gartz to the north of Schwedt.[1] This was unexpected because it required the Red Army to cross the Randowbruch Swamp that lay between the Oder and Randow rivers.