Various armed factions began competing for influence in the power vacuum and turmoil that followed, particularly in the south.[45] In 1990–92, customary law temporarily collapsed,[46] and factional fighting proliferated. In the absence of a central government, Somalia became a "failed state".[47] This precipitated the arrival of UNOSOM I UN military observers in July 1992, followed by the larger UNITAF and UNOSOM II missions. Following an armed conflict between Somali factions and UNOSOM II during 1993, the UN withdrew from Somalia in 1995.[45] After the central government's collapse, there was some return to customary and religious law in most regions.[48] In 1991 and 1998, two autonomous regional governments were also established in the northern part of the country: Somaliland and Puntland.[45] This led to a relative decrease in the intensity of the fighting, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute removing Somalia from its list of major armed conflicts for 1997 and 1998.[49]
In 2000, the Transitional National Government was established, followed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. The trend toward reduced conflict halted in 2005, and sustained and destructive conflict took place in the south in 2005–07,[50] but the battle was of a much lower scale and intensity than in the early 1990s.[49] In 2006, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to depose the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and install the TFG. The ICU effectively disintegrated, and soon after a large scale insurgency began against the occupation as other Islamist groups formed and established themselves as independent actors. Most notably Al-Shabaab rose to prominence in this period,[51] and has since been fighting the Somali government and the AU-mandated AMISOM peacekeeping force for control of the country. Somalia topped the annual Fragile States Index for six years from 2008 up to and including 2013.[52]
In October 2011, following preparatory meetings, Kenyan troops entered southern Somalia ("Operation Linda Nchi") to fight al-Shabaab[53] and establish a buffer zone inside Somalia.[54] Kenyan troops were formally integrated into the multinational force in February 2012.[55] The Federal Government of Somalia was established in August 2012, constituting the country's first permanent central government since the start of the civil war.[56] In 2023, the Las Anod conflict broke out in the northern part of Somalia between SSC-Khatumo and the Somaliland Army.[57] International stakeholders and analysts subsequently began to describe Somalia as a "fragile state" that is making some progress toward stability.[58][59][60][61]
Fraser-Rahim, Muhammad (July 17, 2020). "In Somalia, Iran Is Replicating Russia's Afghan Strategy". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on July 17, 2020. Somali military officials maintain that Iran has been running secret operations to undermine the United States in Somalia, providing sophisticated weapons, improvised explosive100000 als used to make bombs. The military officials allege that Iran and its proxies are complicit in al-Shabab attacks on the U.S. military, Somali forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia
"The Growing Relationship between Iran and al-Shabab Movement in Somalia: Motives and Potential Consequences". Emirates Policy Center. Archived from the original on December 8, 2022. Retrieved July 27, 2020. For Iran, working with non-State actors such as Al-Shabaab and the Houthis is an essential part of its foreign policy, aimed at expanding its geopolitical influence throughout the region. Tehran has developed an unspoken alliance with Al-Shabaab with the aim of creating a covert intelligence network that will allow it to achieve its goals and support its interests in the Middle East and Africa.
Ahmed, Guled (February 9, 2021). "As Farmaajo digs in with Qatari backing, Somalia's election crisis grows worse". Middle East Institute. Archived from the original on February 9, 2021. Qatar has allegedly used al-Shabab to target groups it has identified as opposing its interests, including Somali politicians critical of Doha's role in the country and outside actors like the United Arab Emirates
Yüksel, Engin; Tekineş, Haşim (August 26, 2021). "Turkish-Qatari approaches to conflict and crisis across the region". Clingendael. Archived from the original on August 26, 2021. Qatari individuals and government representatives are reported to have been in regular contact with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen in order to exert geopolitical influence
Houreld, Katharine (November 10, 2021). "Iranian-supplied arms smuggled from Yemen into Somalia, study says". Reuters. Archived from the original on November 10, 2021. Guns supplied by Iran to its Houthi allies in Yemen are being smuggled across the Gulf of Aden to Somalia, according to a Geneva-based think tank, where al Qaeda-linked al Shabab insurgents are battling a weak and divided government.
Redondo, Raúl (July 20, 2020). "Iran allies with Al-Shabaab in Somalia to distribute arms to Houthi rebels". Atalayar. Archived from the original on August 19, 2023. Iran has established links with the jihadist group Al-Shabaab in Somalia to attack United States and other international forces in the African country and the region and to supply arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen
"Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)"(PDF). un.org. UN Security Council. October 11, 2024. pp. 2, 12. Archived from the original(PDF) on November 8, 2024. In addition, increased smuggling activities involving small arms and light weapons are observed between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with indications of shared military supplies or a common supplier. ... Houthis are evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast. To that end, they are strengthening ties with the terrorist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab).
Bashir, Hamdi (October 7, 2020). "The Future of the Role of Iran's Quds Force in Africa". Emirates Policy Center. Archived from the original on December 8, 2022. The Quds Force has been working with agents and allies, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Somalia's Al-Shabaab, which are thought to have recently established relations with the Quds Force.
Fraser-Rahim, Muhammad (July 17, 2020). "In Somalia, Iran Is Replicating Russia's Afghan Strategy". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on July 17, 2020. Somali police and finance ministry officials claim the Quds Force uses these networks to smuggle Iranian oil into Somalia and then sell cheap oil across Africa to subvert U.S. sanctions, with some of the proceeds used to support militants in Yemen and Somalia
^Robinson, Colin (2016). "Revisiting the rise and fall of the Somali Armed Forces, 1960–2012". Defense & Security Analysis. 32 (3): 237–252. doi:10.1080/14751798.2016.1199122. S2CID156874430.
^Central Intelligence Agency (2011). "Somalia". The World Factbook. Langley, Virginia: Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on July 1, 2014. Retrieved October 5, 2011.
^Central Intelligence Agency (2003). "Somalia - Government - Judicial branch". The World Factbook. Langley, Virginia: Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on March 4, 2016. Retrieved May 18, 2015.
^ abIn 2007, Menkhaus wrote that 'armed conflict in Somalia has generally subsided since the early 1990s. Armed clashes continue to break out, but are nowhere near the scale and intensity of the fighting that destroyed Hargeisa in 1988–89 or Mogadishu in 1991–92.' Menkhaus, FSIP, 2007, 75.
^United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011), S/2012/544, p.226
^"Kenya – KDF". AMIS. Archived from the original on April 2, 2013. Retrieved May 5, 2015.
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