Textualism

Judicial interpretation
Forms
Constitutional review In Catholic canon law In Islamic jurisprudence Kritarchy Statutory interpretation Ultra vires Judicial activism Judicial discretion Judicial restraint
General rules of interpretation
Golden rule Interpretation Act Justiciability Letter and spirit of the law Mischief rule Nondelegation doctrine Plain meaning rule Precedent Reasonableness Rule according to higher law Separation of powers Judicial independence Parliamentary sovereignty
General theories of interpretation
Common good constitutionalism Indeterminacy debate Legal realism Legal process Legal formalism Legitimacy Living Constitution / Living tree / Living instrument Originalism (original meaning) Original intent (legislative intent, legislative history) Purposive approach Strict constructionism Textualism
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Constitutional law of the United States

Overview
Articles Amendments History Judicial review
Principles
Separation of powers Individual rights Rule of law Federalism Republicanism Equal footing Tiers of scrutiny
Government structure
Legislative branch Executive branch Judicial branch State government Local government
Individual rights
Freedom of religion Freedom of speech Freedom of the press Freedom of assembly Right to petition Freedom of association Right to keep and bear arms Right to trial by jury Criminal procedural rights Right to privacy Freedom from slavery Due process Equal protection Citizenship Voting rights Right to candidacy Comprehensible rules
Theory
Living Constitution Originalism Substantive due process Political process theory Judicial restraint Purposivism Textualism Strict constructionism Common good constitutionalism
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Textualism is a formalist theory in which the interpretation of the law is based exclusively on the ordinary meaning of the legal text, where no consideration is given to non-textual sources, such as intention of the law when passed, the problem it was intended to remedy, or significant questions regarding the justice or rectitude of the law.^[1]

^ Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (2001) ISBN 978-0-7006-1141-6.