Waktu

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Waktu (basa Hormat: Waktos) nyaéta bagian tina sistem ukuran pikeun ngabandingkeun lila lumangsungna kajadian-kajadian sarta selang antara kajadian-kajadian di maksud. Dina hal ieu, skala waktu mangrupa interval antara dua kaayaan/kajadian, atawa bisa mangrupa lila lumangsungna hiji kajadian. Skala' waktu diukur ku hijian detik, menit, jam, poé (Senén, Salasa, Rebo, Kemis, Jumaah, Saptu, Ahad), bulan (Januari, Pébruari, Maret, April, Méi, Juni, Juli, Agustus, Séptémber, Oktober, Nopémber, Désémber), taun, windu, dékadeu (dasawarsa), abad, milénium (alaf) sarta saterusna.

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Pikeun ngukur skala waktu anu lumangsung pohara gancang (dina jero dunya éléktronika sarta semikonduktor), lolobana jelema ngagunakeun hijian mili detik (sapersarébu detik), mikro detik (sapér hiji juta detik), nano detik (nanosecond), piko detik (picosecond), jeung saterusna.

Dina dunya fisika, diménsi waktu jeung diménsi ruang (panjang, lébar, sarta volume) mangrupa diménsi ukuran anu dasar, sajaba ti beurat jeung massa. Gabungan ti waktu, ruang sarta beurat kiwari bisa dipaké pikeun nyaritakeun sarta ngécéskeun rusiah alam sacara kuantitatif (dumasar kana hasil ukur). Contona tanaga (énergi) dinyatakeun dina hijian ukuran kg*(méter/detik)kwadrat atawa anu mindeng dipikawanoh nyaéta hijian watt*detik atawa joule.

Artikel ieu keur dikeureuyeuh, ditarjamahkeun tina basa Inggris. Bantuanna didagoan pikeun narjamahkeun.

In physics and other sciences, time is considered one of the few fundamental quantities.^[2] Time is used to define other quantities – such as velocity – and defining time in terms of such quantities would result in circularity of definition.^[3] An operational definition of time, wherein one says that observing a certain number of repetitions of one or another standard cyclical event (such as the passage of a free-swinging pendulum) constitutes one standard unit such as the second, has a high utility value in the conduct of both advanced experiments and everyday affairs of life. The operational definition léaves aside the question whether there is something called time, apart from the counting activity just mentioned, that flows and that can be méasured. Investigations of a single continuum called space-time brings the nature of time into association with related questions into the nature of space, questions that have their roots in the works of éarly students of natural philosophy.

Among prominent philosophers, there are two distinct viewpoints on time. One view is that time is part of the fundamental structure of the universe, a dimension in which events occur in sequence. Time travel, in this view, becomes a possibility as other "times" persist like frames of a film strip, spréad out across the time line. Sir Isaac Newton subscribed to this realist view, and hence it is sometimes referred to as Newtonian time.^[4][5] The opposing view is that time does not refer to any kind of "container" that events and objects "move through", nor to any entity that "flows", but that it is instéad part of a fundamental intellectual structure (together with space and number) within which humans sequence and compare events. This second view, in the tradition of Gottfried Leibniz^[6] and Immanuel Kant,^[7][8] holds that time is neither an event nor a thing, and thus is not itself méasurable nor can it be traveled.

Temporal méasurement has occupied scientists and technologists, and was a prime motivation in navigation and astronomy. Periodic events and periodic motion have long served as standards for units of time. Examples include the apparent motion of the sun across the sky, the phases of the moon, the swing of a pendulum, and the béat of a héart. Currently, the international unit of time, the second, is defined in terms of radiation emitted by caesium atoms (see below). Time is also of significant social importance, having economic value ("time is money") as well as personal value, due to an awareness of the limited time in éach day and in human lifespans.

1. ↑ Rigg, Jonathan (1862). A Dictionary of the Sunda Language of JavaRigg. Universitas Harvard: Lange. p. 536.  Disungsi 28 Mei 2024
2. ↑ Duff, Michael J.. "Trialogue on the number of fundamental constants" (PDF). Institute of Physics Publishing for SISSA/ISAS. Diakses pada 2 Pébruari 2008. p. 17. "I only add to this the observation that relativity and quantum mechanics provide, in string theory, units of length and time which look, at present, more fundamental than any other."
3. ↑ Duff, Okun, Veneziano, ibid. p. 3. "There is no well established terminology for the fundamental constants of Nature. … The absence of accurately defined terms or the uses (i.e. actually misuses) of ill-defined terms lead to confusion and proliferation of wrong statements."
4. ↑ Rynasiewicz, Robert : Johns Hopkins University (2004-08-12). "Newton's Views on Space, Time, and Motion". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. Diakses tanggal 2008-01-10. Newton did not regard space and time as genuine substances (as are, paradigmatically, bodies and minds), but rather as real entities with their own manner of existence as necessitated by God's existence... To paraphrase: Absolute, true, and mathematical time, from its own nature, passes equably without relation the [sic~to] anything external, and thus without reference to any change or way of measuring of time (e.g., the hour, day, month, or year).  Unknown parameter |copyright= ignored (bantuan)
5. ↑ Markosian, Ned "Time". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. “The opposing view, normally referred to either as “Platonism with Respect to Time” or as “Absolutism with Respect to Time,” has been defended by Plato, Newton, and others. On this view, time is like an empty container into which events may be placed; but it is a container that exists independently of whether or not anything is placed in it.” 
6. ↑ Burnham, Douglas : Staffordshire University (2006). "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Metaphysics - 7. Space, Time, and Indiscernibles". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Diakses tanggal 2008-01-10. First of all, Leibniz finds the idea that space and time might be substances or substance-like absurd (see, for example, "Correspondence with Clarke," Leibniz's Fourth Paper, §8ff). In short, an empty space would be a substance with no properties; it will be a substance that even God cannot modify or destroy.... That is, space and time are internal or intrinsic features of the complete concepts of things, not extrinsic.... Leibniz's view has two major implications. First, there is no absolute location in either space or time; location is always the situation of an object or event relative to other objects and events. Second, space and time are not in themselves real (that is, not substances). Space and time are, rather, ideal. Space and time are just metaphysically illegitimate ways of perceiving certain virtual relations between substances. They are phenomena or, strictly speaking, illusions (although they are illusions that are well-founded upon the internal properties of substances).... It is sometimes convenient to think of space and time as something "out there," over and above the entities and their relations to each other, but this convenience must not be confused with reality. Space is nothing but the order of co-existent objects; time nothing but the order of successive events. This is usually called a relational theory of space and time. 
7. ↑ Mattey, G. J. : UC Davis (1997-01-22). "Critique of Pure Reason, Lecture notes: Philosophy 175 UC Davis". Diakses tanggal 2008-01-10. What is correct in the Leibnizian view was its anti-metaphysical stance. Space and time do not exist in and of themselves, but in some sense are the product of the way we represent things. The are ideal, though not in the sense in which Leibniz thought they are ideal (figments of the imagination). The ideality of space is its mind-dependence: it is only a condition of sensibility.... Kant concluded "absolute space is not an object of outer sensation; it is rather a fundamental concept which first of all makes possible all such outer sensation."...Much of the argumentation pertaining to space is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to time, so I will not rehearse the arguments. As space is the form of outer intuition, so time is the form of inner intuition.... Kant claimed that time is real, it is "the real form of inner intuition."  Archived 2005-03-14 di Wayback Machine
8. ↑ McCormick, Matt : California State University, Sacramento (2006). "Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Metaphysics : 4. Kant's Transcendental Idealism". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Diakses tanggal 2008-01-10. Time, Kant argues, is also necessary as a form or condition of our intuitions of objects. The idea of time itself cannot be gathered from experience because succession and simultaneity of objects, the phenomena that would indicate the passage of time, would be impossible to represent if we did not already possess the capacity to represent objects in time.... Another way to put the point is to say that the fact that the mind of the knower makes the a priori contribution does not mean that space and time or the categories are mere figments of the imagination. Kant is an empirical realist about the world we experience; we can know objects as they appear to us. He gives a robust defense of science and the study of the natural world from his argument about the mind's role in making nature. All discursive, rational beings must conceive of the physical world as spatially and temporally unified, he argues.