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Correlated equilibrium
| Correlated equilibrium | |
|---|---|
| Solution concept in game theory | |
| Relationship | |
| Superset of | Nash equilibrium |
| Significance | |
| Proposed by | Robert Aumann |
| Example | Chicken |
In game theory, a correlated equilibrium is a solution concept that is more general than the well known Nash equilibrium. It was first discussed by mathematician Robert Aumann in 1974.[1][2] The idea is that each player chooses their action according to their private observation of the value of the same public signal. A strategy assigns an action to every possible observation a player can make. If no player would want to deviate from their strategy (assuming the others also don't deviate), the distribution from which the signals are drawn is called a correlated equilibrium.
- ^ Aumann, Robert (1974). "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies". Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1 (1): 67–96. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.120.1740. doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8.
- ^ Aumann, Robert (1987). "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality". Econometrica. 55 (1): 1–18. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.295.4243. doi:10.2307/1911154. JSTOR 1911154. S2CID 18649722.
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