Proclaiming the nascent organisation as "a new stage in the life of the blessed revolution", Abu Jaber urged all factions of the Syrian opposition to unite under its Islamic leadership and wage a "popular jihad" to achieve the objectives of the Syrian revolution, which he characterised as the ouster of the Ba'athist regime and Hezbollah militants from Syrian territories, and the formation of an Islamic government.[62] After the announcement, additional groups and individuals joined. The merged group has been primarily led by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and former Ahrar al-Sham leaders, although the High Command also has representation from other groups.[63] The Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement[6] split from Tahrir al-Sham in July 2017, and the Ansar al-Din Front in 2018.[64]
The formation of HTS was followed by a string of assassinations of its supporters. In response, HTS launched a successful crackdown on Al-Qaeda loyalists, which cemented its power in Idlib. HTS then pursued a "Syrianisation" programme, focused on establishing a stable civilian administration that provides services and connects to humanitarian organizations in addition to maintaining law and order.[61] Tahrir al-Sham's strategy was based on expanding its territorial control in Syria, establishing governance and mobilising popular support. In 2017, HTS permitted Turkish troops to patrol North-West Syria as part of a ceasefire brokered through the Astana negotiations. Its policies brought it into conflict with Hurras al-Deen, Al-Qaeda's Syrian wing, including militarily.[65] HTS had an estimated 6,000–15,000 members in 2022.[23]
From 2017 to 2024, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham gave allegiance to the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), which was an alternative government of the Syrian opposition in the Idlib Governorate.[66][67] While the organisation officially adhered to the Salafi school, the High Council of Fatwa of the Syrian Salvation Government – to which it is religiously beholden – consisted of ulema from Ash'arite and Sufi traditions as well. In its legal system and educational curriculum, HTS implemented Shafi'ite thought and taught the importance of the four classical Sunnimadhahib (schools of law) in Islamic jurisprudence.[68] After the fall of Damascus, the SSG was replaced by the Syrian transitional government. From 2021 to the fall of Assad, HTS was the most powerful military faction within the Syrian opposition.[69] Τhe organisation was designated a terrorist group by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254,[70] which classified the group's precursor, Al-Nusra Front.[71] On 29 January 2025, at a conference in Damascus, Hussein Abdel Ghani, spokesperson for the Military Operations Administration, declared in a speech that all military factions would be dissolved and become part of "state institutions."[72][18]
^Cite error: The named reference jaber was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ abDrevon, Haenni; Jerome, Patrick (2021). How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute: European University Institute. pp. i, 8, 28–29. ISSN1028-3625.
^ abDrevon, Jerome (2024). From Jihad to Politics: How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 2, 132. ISBN9780197765166. LCCN2024012918.
^Zelin, Aaron Y. (2022). "2: The Development of Political Jihadism". The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. pp. 34, 35. ISBN979-8-9854474-4-6.
^Drevon, Haenni; Jerome, Patrick (2021). "Abstract". How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria(PDF). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute. p. v. ISSN1028-3625. Archived(PDF) from the original on 29 January 2023. Retrieved 16 January 2023. HTS's domination was followed by a policy of gradual opening and mainstreamisation. The group has had to open up to local communities and make concessions, especially in the religious sphere. HTS is seeking international acceptance with the development of a strategic partnership with Turkey and desires to open dialogue with Western countries. Overall, HTS has transformed from formerly being a salafi jihadi organisation into having a new mainstream approach to political Islam.
^Grant-Brook, William (2023). "The State in Idlib: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Complexity Amid the Syrian Civil War". In Fraihat, Alijla; Ibrahim, Abdalhadi (eds.). Rebel Governance in the Middle East. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 78. ISBN978-981-99-1334-3. Over the decade of Syria's conflict, HTS has morphed from an al-Qa'ida affiliated transnational jihadist group that was one of many opposition units to a locally rooted, conservative Islamist movement that is the de facto state power in one corner of the country.
Drevon, Jerome (2024). From Jihad to Politics: How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 3, 196, 197, 203–206. ISBN9780197765166. LCCN2024012918.
Fraihat, Alijla; Ibrahim, Abdalhadi; Grant-Brook, William (2023). "The State in Idlib: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Complexity Amid the Syrian Civil War". Rebel Governance in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 76. doi:10.1007/978-981-99-1335-0. ISBN978-981-99-1334-3. S2CID264040574. HTS's most important foreign relationship at present is with Ankara. HTS has a close relationship with its northern neighbour, allowing Turkish soldiers' presence in Idlib to uphold an unstable stalemate with Assad's forces.
Hamming, Tore (2022). Jihadi Politics: The Global Jihadi Civil War, 2014–2019. London, UK: Hurst. pp. 48, 396. ISBN9781787387027. Ahrar al-Sham (and later HTS) established close relations with Turkey. ... In Syria, Turkey managed to establish close relations first with Ahrar al-Sham and subsequently with HTS.
"Containing Transnational Jihadists in Syria's North West". International Crisis Group. 7 March 2023. Archived from the original on 7 March 2023. HTS declared that only it or al-Fatah al-Mubin, which it leads together with Turkish-backed factions (though it is the dominant force), could conduct military operations in Idlib.
^Sosnowski, Marika (2023). Redefining Ceasefires: Wartime Order and Statebuilding in Syria. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 153. ISBN978-1-009-34722-8.
^Drevon, Haenni; Jeromev, Patrick (2021). How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute. pp. 18, 29–31. ISSN1028-3625.
^Zelin, Aaron Y. (2022). "2: The Development of Political Jihadism". The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Washington DC, USA: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. p. 11. ISBN979-8-9854474-4-6.
^Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. "The Factions of North Latakia". Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. Archived from the original on 21 September 2018. Retrieved 21 September 2018.
^Drevon, Haenni; Jerome, Patrick (2021). "Abstract". How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria(PDF). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute. p. v. ISSN1028-3625. Archived(PDF) from the original on 29 January 2023. Retrieved 16 January 2023. HTS's domination was followed by a policy of gradual opening and mainstreamisation. The group has had to open up to local communities and make concessions, especially in the religious sphere. HTS is seeking international acceptance with the development of a strategic partnership with Turkey and desires to open dialogue with Western countries. Overall, HTS has transformed from formerly being a salafi jihadi organisation into having a new mainstream approach to political Islam.
^Zelin, Aaron Y. (2022). "2: The Development of Political Jihadism". The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. pp. 7–12. ISBN979-8-9854474-4-6.
^Cite error: The named reference bbc was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^"Syria news". Shaam network- www.shaam.org. Archived from the original on 9 October 2018. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
^Drevon, Haenni; Jerome, Patrick (2021). "II: The Political Deprogramming of the Radical Emirate". How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute: European University Institute. pp. 12–20. ISSN1028-3625.
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