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Regulatory capture
| Competition law |
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| Basic concepts |
| Anti-competitive practices |
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| Enforcement authorities and organizations |
In politics, regulatory capture (also called agency capture) is a form of corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulator is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group.[1][2]
When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society. The theory of client politics is related to that of rent-seeking and political failure; client politics "occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (e.g., industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers)".[3]
- ^ Dal Bó, Ernesto (2006). "Regulatory capture: A review". Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 22 (2): 203–225. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj013. JSTOR 23606888.
- ^ "Regulatory Capture Definition". Investopedia. Archived from the original on October 3, 2015. Retrieved October 2, 2015.
- ^ Wilson, James (2000). Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0465007856.[page needed]
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