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Hamas

Hamas (arapski: حماس Hamās, akronim od arapski: حركة المقاومة الاسلامية Harakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya, što približno znači "Islamski pokret otpora", dok se taj izraz u arapskom koristi za "oduševljenje") je palestinska nacionalna islamska organizacija[1] sa vojnim krilom zvanim Brigade Izzudin el-Kasam odana islamističkim principima koju Evropska unija, SAD i dosta drugih zemalja svijeta smatraju terorističkim udruženjem. Usko je povezana sa muslimanskim bratstvom. Njen proklamovirani cilj je "uništenje cionističke i vještačke tvorevine države Izraela" i "uspostavljanje palestinske države na tom okupiranom području, kao i na područjima Gaze i Zapadne obale". U novijoj historiji je poznata i uspješno djeluje kao politička partija u palestinskim autonomnim oblastima. U januaru 2006, ova grupa je pobijedila na palestinskim parlamentarnim izborima, gdje je osvajanjem apsolutne većine mandata u parlamentu, zbacila sa vlasti do tada vladajuću frakciju Fatah. Poslije krvavih unutrašnjih borbi sa Fatahom preuzima kontrolu nad pojasom Gaze dok Fatah ostaje u kontroli Zapadne obale. Od 2007. godine upravlja pojasom Gaze koji je okupirao Izrael.[2][3]

Pokret Hamas je osnovao palestinski islamski učenjak Ahmed Jasin 1987, nakon izbijanja Prve intifade protiv izraelske okupacije. To je proizašlo iz njegove islamske dobrotvorne organizacije Mujama el-Islamija iz 1973. povezane s Muslimanskim bratstvom.[4] Na parlamentarnim izborima 2006. u Palestini, Hamas je osigurao većinu u Palestinskom zakonodavnom vijeću kampanjom na osnovu obećanja o vladi bez korupcije i zalaganjem za otpor kao sredstvo za oslobađanje Palestine od izraelske okupacije.[5][6] U bici za Gazu (2007.), Hamas je preuzeo kontrolu nad pojasom Gaze od rivalske palestinske frakcije Fataha,[7][8] i od tada upravlja teritorijom odvojeno od Palestinskih Autonomnih Područja. Nakon Hamasovog preuzimanja, Izrael je značajno pojačao postojeća ograničenja kretanja i uveo potpunu blokadu pojasa Gaze.[9] Egipat je započeo svoju blokadu Gaze 2007. Nakon toga uslijedilo je više ratova s ​​Izraelom, uključujući one 2008-09, 2012, 2014, 2021. i jedan koji je u toku od 2023, a koji je započeo napadom Hamasa na Izrael 7. oktobra .

Hamas je promovsao palestinski nacionalizam u islamskom kontekstu.[10] Dok je prvobitno tražio državu u cijeloj bivšoj Mandatna Palestina, počeo je pristajati na granice iz 1967. u sporazumima koje je potpisao sa Fatahom 2005, 2006. i 2007.[11][12][13] Hamas je 2017. objavio novu povelju[14] koja podržava palestinsku državu unutar granica iz 1967. bez priznavanja Izraela.[15][16][17] Hamasove ponovljene ponude primirja (na period od 10 do 100 godina[18]) na osnovu granica iz 1967. mnogi vide kao konzistentne sa dvodržavnim rješenjem,[19][20] dok drugi navode da Hamas zadržava dugoročni cilj uspostavljanja jedne države u bivšoj Mandatnoj Palestini.[21][22] Dok je Hamasova povelja iz 1988. naširoko opisana kao antisemitska,[23] Hamasova povelja iz 2017. uklonila je antisemitski jezik i rekla da je Hamasova borba bila sa cionistima, a ne sa Jevrejima.[24][25][26][27] Raspravljalo se da li je povelja odražavala stvarnu promjenu politike.[28]

Što se tiče vanjske politike, Hamas je historijski tražio odnose s Egiptom,[29] Iranom,[29] Katarom,[30] Saudijskom Arabijom,[31] Sirijom[29] i Turskom;[32] neki od njegovih odnosa su bili pod uticajem Arapskog proljeća.[33] Hamas i Izrael su uključeni u dugotrajni oružani sukob. Ključni aspekti sukoba uključuju izraelsku okupaciju Zapadne obale i pojasa Gaze, status Jerusalima, izraelska naselja, granice, prava na vodu,[34] režim dozvola, palestinsku slobodu kretanja,[35] i palestinsko pravo na povratak. Hamas je napao izraelske civile, uključujući samoubilačke napade, kao i lansiranje raketa na izraelske gradove. Brojne zemlje, uključujući Australiju, Kanadu, Izrael, Japan, Novi Zeland, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i Sjedinjene Države, proglasile su Hamas terorističkom organizacijom 2018, dok je zahtjev u Ujedinjenim nacijama za osudu Hamasa odbijen.[36]}}[37][38]

  1. ^ Lopez, Anthony; Ireland, Carol; Ireland, Jane; Lewis, Michael (2020). The Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding. Taylor & Francis. str. 239. ISBN 9780429588952. The most successful radical Sunni Islamist group has been Hamas, which began as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in the early 1980s. It used terrorist attacks against civilians - particularly suicide bombings – to help build a larger movement, going so far as to emerge as the recognized government of the Gaza Strip in the Palestine Authority.
  2. ^ Kear 2018, str. 22.
  3. ^ "What is Hamas? A simple guide to the armed Palestinian group". Al Jazeera. 2023-10-08. Arhivirano s originala, 2023-10-08. Pristupljeno 2024-06-26. Neispravna vrijednost parametra |url-status=deviated (pomoć)
  4. ^ Higgins, Andrew (January 24, 2009). "How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas". The Wall Street Journal. Arhivirano s originala, September 26, 2009. Pristupljeno January 25, 2023. When Israel first encountered Islamists in Gaza in the 1970s and '80s, they seemed focused on studying the Quran, not on confrontation with Israel. The Israeli government officially recognized a precursor to Hamas called Mujama Al-Islamiya, registering the group as a charity. It allowed Mujama members to set up an Islamic university and build mosques, clubs and schools. Crucially, Israel often stood aside when the Islamists and their secular left-wing Palestinian rivals battled, sometimes violently, for influence in both Gaza and the West Bank. 'When I look back at the chain of events I think we made a mistake,' says David Hacham, who worked in Gaza in the late 1980s and early '90s as an Arab-affairs expert in the Israeli military. 'But at the time nobody thought about the possible results.' Israeli officials who served in Gaza disagree on how much their own actions may have contributed to the rise of Hamas. They blame the group's recent ascent on outsiders, primarily Iran. This view is shared by the Israeli government. 'Hamas in Gaza was built by Iran as a foundation for power, and is backed through funding, through training and through the provision of advanced weapons,' Mr. Olmert said last Saturday. Hamas has denied receiving military assistance from Iran.
  5. ^ "Hamas wins huge majority". Al Jazeera (jezik: engleski). Pristupljeno 2024-08-05.
  6. ^ McGreal, Chris (2006-01-27). "Hamas faces unexpected challenge: how to deal with power". The Guardian (jezik: engleski). ISSN 0261-3077. Pristupljeno 2024-08-05.
  7. ^ Davis 2017, str. 67–69.
  8. ^ Mukhimer 2012, str. vii, 58.
  9. ^ "The Gaza Strip | The humanitarian impact of 15 years of blockade – June 2022". Arhivirano s originala, 9 April 2024. Pristupljeno 7 August 2024.
  10. ^ Gelvin 2014, str. 226
  11. ^ Seurat 2019, str. 17–19: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012."
  12. ^ *Baconi 2018, str. 114–116: "["Prisoners' Document"] enshrined many issues that had already been settled, including statehood on the 1967 borders; UN Resolution 194 for the right of return; and the right to resist within the occupied territories...This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle." *Roy 2013, str. 210: "Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas's Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization's willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-state solution, that is, a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return."
  13. ^ Baconi 2018, str. 82: "The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas's military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to: that the movement's immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders."
  14. ^ "Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders: Khaled Meshaal presents a new document in which Hamas accepts 1967 borders without recognising state of Israel Gaza". Al Jazeera. 2 May 2017.
  15. ^ Sources that believe that Hamas' 2017 charter accepted the 1967 borders:
  16. ^ "What does Israel's declaration of war mean for Palestinians in Gaza?". Al Jazeera. 9 October 2023.
  17. ^ "What will the Israeli-Palestinian conflict look like in 30 years?". The Jerusalem Post. 22 September 2023. Even Hamas in 2017 said it was ready to accept a Palestinian state with 1967 borders if it is clear this is the consensus of the Palestinians.
  18. ^ Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod (2008). "Reframing Sacred Values" (PDF). Negotiation Journal. 24 (3): 221–246. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00182.x. Arhivirano (PDF) s originala, 21 January 2024. Pristupljeno 20 March 2024.
  19. ^ *Halim Rane (2009). Reconstructing Jihad Amid Competing International Norms. str. 34. Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, conveyed to me in an interview that "Hamas' 'hudna' is not significantly different from Sharon's 'long-term interim agreement." Similarly, Daniel Levy, a senior Israeli official for the Geneva Initiative (GI), informed me that certain Hamas officials find the GI acceptable, but due to the concerns about their Islamically oriented constituency and their own Islamic identity, they would "have to express the final result in terms of a "hudna," or "indefinite" ceasefire," rather than a formal peace agreement."
    • Loren D. Lybarger (2020). Palestinian Chicago. University of California Press. str. 199. Hamas too would signal a willingness to accept a long-term "hudna" (cessation of hostilities, truce) along the armistice lines of 1948 (an effective acceptance of the two-state formula).
    • Tristan Dunning (2016). Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy. Routledge. str. 179–180.
  20. ^ Baconi 2018, str. 108: "Hamas's finance minister in Gaza stated that 'a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. It's just a question of vocabulary.'"
  21. ^ Alsoos, Imad (2021). "From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization". Middle Eastern Studies. 57 (5): 833–856. doi:10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006. S2CID 234860010.
  22. ^ Faeq, Nasir; Jahnata, Diego (2020). "The Historical Antecedents of Hamas". International Journal of Social Science Research and Review. 3 (3): 33. doi:10.47814/ijssrr.v3i3.49. ISSN 2700-2497. S2CID 234607095.
  23. ^ Qossay Hamed (2023). Hamas in Power: The Question of Transformation. IGI Global. str. 161.
  24. ^ Seurat 2019, str. 17.
  25. ^ Amira, Hass (3 May 2017). "Why Hamas' New Charter Is Aimed at Palestinians, Not Israelis". Haaretz. Arhivirano s originala, 23 April 2023. Pristupljeno 12 November 2024.
  26. ^ Timea Spitka (2023). National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Springer International Publishing. str. 88–89.
  27. ^ "Khaled Meshaal: Struggle is against Israel, not Jews". Al-Jazeera. 6 May 2017. Arhivirano s originala, 19 November 2023. Pristupljeno 19 November 2023.
  28. ^ Spoerl, Joseph S. (2020). "Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism". Jewish Political Studies Review. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. 31 (1/2): 210–244. ISSN 0792-335X. JSTOR 26870795. Arhivirano s originala, 16 January 2024. Pristupljeno 27 January 2024. Strictly speaking, the Hamas Covenant of 1988 focused its anti-Semitic language on Zionists, for example, describing The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the blueprint for the Zionist project (Article 32) and accusing the Zionists of aiming to "annihilate Islam" (Article 28). The May 2017 "Document" continues in this vein, albeit in somewhat less florid language, asserting that "the Zionist project does not target the Palestinian people alone; it is the enemy of the Arabic and Islamic Ummah posing a grave threat to its security and interests. It is also hostile to the Ummah's aspirations for unity, renaissance, and liberation and has been the major source of its troubles. The Zionist project also poses a danger to international security and peace and to mankind…." (#15). As in the 1988 Covenant, the 2017 "Document" merely takes all the classical tropes of anti-Semitism and focuses them on Zionism, noting that "it is the Zionists who constantly identify Judaism and the Jews with their own colonial project and illegal entity" (#16). In effect, Hamas is saying that it is at war with all Jews except those who are anti-Zionist, thus it is not anti-Semitic. This can hardly be regarded as a serious repudiation of anti-Semitism.
  29. ^ a b c Seurat 2022, str. 88.
  30. ^ Baconi 2018, str. 181.
  31. ^ Samuel Ramani (2015-09-01). "Hamas's Pivot to Saudi Arabia". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  32. ^ Seurat 2022, str. 254.
  33. ^ Seurat 2022, str. 115,214.
  34. ^ "Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". Government of Canada. Arhivirano s originala, 18 February 2018. Pristupljeno 13 March 2010.
  35. ^ "Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy" (PDF). World Bank. 9 May 2007. Arhivirano s originala (PDF), 10 April 2010. Pristupljeno 29 March 2010. Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions
  36. ^ DW 2018.
  37. ^ Dupret, Baudouin; Lynch, Michael; Berard, Tim (2015). Law at Work: Studies in Legal Ethnomethods. Oxford University Press. str. 279. ISBN 9780190210243. [It has been alleged that] Hamas cynically abuses its own civilian population and their suffering for propaganda purposes.
  38. ^ "UN rejects US motion to condemn Hamas – DW – 12/07/2018". dw.com (jezik: engleski). Pristupljeno 2024-08-05.

Hamas

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