Back تصعيد صراع Arabic Escalada de conflicte Catalan Eskalation German Eskaliĝo EO Escalada (conflicto) Spanish Spirale bellica Italian Escalatieladder Dutch Eskalacja konfliktu Polish Upptrappning Swedish
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Conflict escalation is the process by which conflicts grow in severity or scale over time. That may refer to conflicts between individuals or groups in interpersonal relationships, or it may refer to the escalation of hostilities in a political or military context. In systems theory, the process of conflict escalation is modeled by positive feedback. Conflict escalation can be modeled with game theory.[1] In contrast, de-escalation are approaches which lead to a decrease or end of a conflict.[2]
While the word escalation was used as early as in 1938, it was popularized during the Cold War by two important books: On Escalation (Herman Kahn, 1965) and Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Bernard Brodie, 1966).[3] In those contexts, it especially referred to war between two major states with weapons of mass destruction during the Cold War.
Conflict escalation has a tactical role in military conflict and is often formalized with explicit rules of engagement. Highly-successful military tactics exploit a particular form of conflict escalation such as by controlling an opponent's reaction time, which allows the tactician to pursue or trap his opponent. Both Napoleon Bonaparte and Heinz Guderian advocated that approach. Sun Tzu elaborated it in a more abstract form and maintained that military strategy was about minimizing escalation and diplomacy was about eliminating it.
- ^ Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc (1987). "Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis". The American Political Science Review. 81 (3): 833–850. doi:10.2307/1962679. JSTOR 1962679.
- ^ Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. "Rational Deescalation." (1985).
- ^ Freedman, Lawrence (1993). The evolution of nuclear strategy (2nd ed.). New York: St Martin's press. pp. 198–199. ISBN 0-312-02843-1.