Back Nyaya AF نيايا Arabic Nyaya AZ Няя Bulgarian न्याय BH ন্যায় (দর্শন) Bengali/Bangla Nyaya Catalan Njája Czech Nyaya German Njaja EO
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Nyāya (Sanskrit:न्यायः, IAST:'nyāyaḥ'), literally meaning "justice", "rules", "method" or "judgment",[1][2] is one of the six orthodox (Āstika) schools of Hindu philosophy.[2] Nyāya's most significant contributions to Indian philosophy were systematic development of the theory of logic, methodology, and its treatises on epistemology.[3][4]
Nyāya school's epistemology accepts four out of six Pramanas as reliable means of gaining knowledge – Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāna (comparison and analogy) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).[5][6][7] In its metaphysics, Nyāya school is closer to the Vaisheshika school of Hinduism than others.[2] It holds that human suffering results from mistakes/defects produced by activity under wrong knowledge (notions and ignorance).[8] Moksha (liberation), it states, is gained through right knowledge. This premise led Nyāya to concern itself with epistemology, that is the reliable means to gain correct knowledge and to remove wrong notions. False knowledge is not merely ignorance to Naiyyayikas, it includes delusion. Correct knowledge is discovering and overcoming one's delusions, and understanding true nature of soul, self and reality.[9]
Naiyyayika scholars approached philosophy as a form of direct realism, stating that anything that really exists is in principle humanly knowable. To them, correct knowledge and understanding is different from simple, reflexive cognition; it requires Anuvyavasaya (अनुव्यवसाय, cross-examination of cognition, reflective cognition of what one thinks one knows).[10] An influential collection of texts on logic and reason is the Nyāya Sūtras, attributed to Aksapada Gautama, variously estimated to have been composed between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE.[11][12]
Nyāya school shares some of its methodology and human suffering foundations with Buddhism; however, a key difference between the two is that Buddhism believes that there is neither a soul nor self;[13] Nyāya school like some other schools of Hinduism such as Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita believes that there is a soul and self, with liberation (mokṣa) as a state of removal of ignorance, wrong knowledge, the gain of correct knowledge, and unimpeded continuation of self.[14][15]
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
mmwwas invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ a b c "Nyaya | Logic, Epistemology, Ethics | Britannica". www.britannica.com. Retrieved 3 May 2024.
- ^ B Gupta (2012), An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge and Freedom, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-80003-7, pages 171–189
- ^ PT Raju (1985), Structural Depths of Indian Thought: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Ethics, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-88706-139-4, page 223
- ^ John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-7914-3067-5, page 238
- ^ DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer, ISBN 978-1-4419-8109-7, page 172
- ^ Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-43878-0, page 225
- ^ Vassilis Vitsaxis (2009), Thought and Faith, Somerset Hall Press, ISBN 978-1-935244-04-2, page 131
- ^ BK Matilal (1997), Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-81-208-0717-4, pages 353–357
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
olilwas invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Jeaneane Fowler (2002), Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, Sussex Academic Press, ISBN 978-1-898723-94-3, page 129
- ^ B. K. Matilal "Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge" (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. xiv.
- ^ KN Jayatilleke (2010), Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, ISBN 978-81-208-0619-1, pages 246–249, from note 385 onwards;
Steven Collins (1994), Religion and Practical Reason (Editors: Frank Reynolds, David Tracy), State Univ of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-7914-2217-5, page 64; Quote: "Central to Buddhist soteriology is the doctrine of not-self (Pali: anattā, Sanskrit: anātman, the opposed doctrine of ātman is central to Brahmanical thought). Put very briefly, this is the [Buddhist] doctrine that human beings have no soul, no self, no unchanging essence.";
Edward Roer (Translator), Shankara's Introduction, p. 2, at Google Books, pages 2–4
Katie Javanaud (2013), Is The Buddhist 'No-Self' Doctrine Compatible With Pursuing Nirvana?, Philosophy Now;
John C. Plott et al (2000), Global History of Philosophy: The Axial Age, Volume 1, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-81-208-0158-5, page 63, Quote: "The Buddhist schools reject any Ātman concept. As we have already observed, this is the basic and ineradicable distinction between Hinduism and Buddhism". - ^ BK Matilal (1997), Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-81-208-0717-4, pages 354–355
- ^ David Ambeul (1998), Ontology in Indian Philosophy, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Editor: Edward Craig), Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-07310-3, pages 118–127