Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

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Armed Forces High Command
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
Active	4 February 1938 – 23 May 1945
Country	Nazi Germany
Allegiance	Adolf Hitler
Type	High command
Role	Nominally oversaw: Army High Command Naval High Command Air Force High Command
Part of	Armed forces
Headquarters	Wünsdorf
Nickname(s)	OKW
Engagements	World War II in Europe
Commanders
Chief of the OKW	Wilhelm Keitel
Chief of Operations Staff	Alfred Jodl
Insignia
Chief of the OKW flag (1938–1941)
Chief of the OKW flag (1941–1945)

The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German: [ˈoːbɐkɔˌmando deːɐ̯ ˈveːɐ̯ˌmaxt] ^ⓘ; abbreviated OKW German: [oːkaːˈveː] ^ⓘ; Armed Forces High Command)^[1] was the supreme military command and control office of Nazi Germany during World War II. Created in 1938, the OKW replaced the Reich Ministry of War and had oversight over the individual high commands of the country's armed forces: the army (Heer), navy (Kriegsmarine), and air force (Luftwaffe). With the start of World War II, tactical control of the Waffen-SS was also exercised by it.^[2]

Rivalry with the different services' commands, mainly with the Army High Command (OKH), prevented the OKW from becoming a unified German General Staff in an effective chain of command, though it did help coordinate operations among the three services. During the war, the OKW acquired more and more operational powers. By 1942, the OKW had responsibility for all theatres except for the Eastern Front. However, Adolf Hitler manipulated the system in order to prevent any one command from taking a dominant role in decision making.^[3] This "divide and conquer" method helped put most military decisions in Hitler's own hands, which at times included even those affecting engagements at the battalion level,^[3] a practice which, due to bureaucratic delays and Hitler's worsening indecision as the war progressed, would eventually contribute to Germany's defeat.