Operation Moshtarak

Operation Moshtarak
Part of the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)
Date February 13, 2010 – December 7, 2010 Location Marjah, Helmand Province, Afghanistan 31°31′N 64°07′E / 31.517°N 64.117°E / 31.517; 64.117 Result Tactically inconclusive NATO occupation of Marjah district Strategic Taliban victory[1] NATO withdrawal; Taliban recapture of Marjah[1]
Belligerents
ISAF  United States  United Kingdom  France  Estonia  Denmark  Canada Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	Taliban Al-Qaeda
Commanders and leaders
ISAF Mohammad Zazai[2] James Cowan Nick Carter Stanley McChrystal Lawrence D. Nicholson Randall Newman	Abdul Qayyum Zakir Abdur Razzaq Akhundzada Naeem Baraikh Qari Fasihuddin Abdullah Nasrat Mullah Mohammad Basir
Strength
4,000[3] 1,200 (up to 4,200 available)[3] 2,500[4] Approx. 70 Approx. 61 Total: 15,000+ troops[5]	2,000 insurgents (Taliban claim)[6] 400–1,000 insurgents (U.S. estimate)[7]
Casualties and losses
45 killed 15+ killed 13 killed	120+ killed (first 5 days)[8] 56 captured
Civilian casualties[9] 28 killed, 70 injured
Marjah class=notpageimage| Helmand Province in Afghanistan

Operation Moshtarak (Dari for Together or Joint), also known as the Battle of Marjah, was an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) pacification offensive in the town of Marjah, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. It involved a combined total of 15,000 Afghan, American, British, Canadian, Danish, and Estonian troops, constituting the largest joint operation of the War in Afghanistan up to that point. The purpose of the operation was to remove the Taliban from Marja, thus eliminating the last Taliban stronghold in central Helmand Province.^[10] The main target of the offensive was the town of Marjah, which had been controlled for years by the Taliban as well as drug traffickers.

Although Moshtarak was described as the largest operation in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, it was originally supposed to be the prelude to a much larger offensive in Kandahar that would follow Moshtarak by several months.^[11] ISAF chose to heavily publicize the operation before it was launched, comparing its scope and size to the 2004 Second Battle of Fallujah, in the hopes that Taliban fighters in the town would flee.^[12]

The operation was also designed to showcase improvements in both the Afghan government and Afghan security forces. ISAF claimed that the operation was "Afghan-led" and would use five Afghan brigades.^[13] General Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of ISAF, also promised that following the offensive ISAF would install a "government in a box" in Marja.^[14]

While initially successful, ISAF and the Afghan government failed to set up a working government in the town, leading to a successful resurgence by the Taliban; 90 days into the offensive General McChrystal famously referred to it as a "bleeding ulcer".^[15][16] In October the town was still described as "troubling",^[17] but by early December the fighting there was declared "essentially over".^[18]

Shortly after the withdrawal of NATO soldiers from Marja, it was reported the Taliban had regained control of the town and district with US army analysts describing the goals of the operation as a failure.^[1] It has later been cited as a critical turning point in the war, as its failure lead the Obama administration to shift in strategy, away from increasing the number of American combatants for a decisive victory and toward deescalation of the war.^[19]