Back عملية عباد الشمس Arabic Операция „Зоненблуме“ Bulgarian Unternehmen Sonnenblume German Επιχείρηση ηλιοτρόπιο Greek Operación Sonnenblume Spanish عملیات زوننبلومه FA Operaatio Sonnenblume Finnish Opération Sonnenblume French Operasi Sonnenblume ID Operazione Girasole Italian
| Unternehmen Sonnenblume/Operation Sunflower | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of The Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War | |||||||||
 Map showing the area and events of Operation Sonnenblume | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Germany Italy | |||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
|
Italo Gariboldi Erwin Rommel |
Archibald Wavell Philip Neame (POW) from 6 April | ||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||
|
Deutsches Afrikakorps 10ª Armata | Cyrenaica Command (Cyrcom) | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| Elements of 2 German and 3 Italian divisions |
1 division 3 brigades 1 armoured brigade (understrength) | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 103–107 tanks |
3,000 captured All tanks lost | ||||||||
Operation Sonnenblume (Unternehmen Sonnenblume, "Operation Sunflower") was the name given to the dispatch of German and Italian troops to North Africa in February 1941, during the Second World War. The Italian 10th Army (10ª Armata) had been destroyed by the British, Commonwealth, Empire and Allied Western Desert Force attacks during Operation Compass (9 December 1940 – 9 February 1941). The first units of the new Deutsches Afrikakorps (DAK), commanded by Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel, departed Naples for Africa and arrived on 11 February 1941. (In the English-speaking world, the term Afrika Korps became a generic term for German forces in North Africa.) On 14 February, advanced units of the 5th Light Afrika Division (later renamed the 21st Panzer Division), Aufklärungsbataillon 3 (Reconnaissance Battalion 3) and Panzerjägerabteilung 39 (Anti-tank Detachment 39) arrived at the Libyan port of Tripoli and were sent immediately to the front line east of Sirte.
Rommel arrived in Libya on 12 February, with orders to defend Tripoli and Tripolitania, albeit using aggressive tactics. General Italo Gariboldi replaced Maresciallo d'Italia (Marshal of Italy) Rodolfo Graziani as the Governor-General of Libya on 25 March and Generale d'Armata Mario Roatta, Commander in Chief of the Royal Italian Army (Regio Esercito), ordered Graziani to place Italian motorised units in Libya under the new Italian–German command. The first German troops reached Sirte on 15 February, advanced to Nofilia on 18 February and a German raiding party ambushed a British patrol near El Agheila on 24 February. On 24 March, the Axis captured El Agheila and on 31 March attacked Mersa Brega. The understrength 3rd Armoured Brigade failed to counter-attack and began to retreat towards Benghazi the next day.
When the 3rd Armoured Brigade moved, its worn-out tanks began to break down, as had been predicted. The brigade failed to prevent Axis flanking moves in the desert south of the Cyrenaican bulge, which left Australian infantry in Benghazi no option but to retreat up the Via Balbia. Rommel split his forces into small columns to harry the British retreat as far the Axis fuel and water shortage permitted. A considerable British force was captured at Mechili, which led to the British retreat continuing to Tobruk and then on to the Libyan–Egyptian frontier. Axis forces failed to capture Tobruk in the first rush and Rommel then had to divide the Axis forces between Tobruk and the frontier.
Sonnenblume succeeded because the ability of the Germans to mount an offensive was underestimated by General Archibald Wavell, the Commander in Chief Middle East, the War Office and Winston Churchill. Rommel transformed the situation by his audacity, which was unexpected, despite copious intelligence reports from the decryption of signals from the German Enigma coding machine and MI14 (British Military Intelligence). Many experienced British units had been transferred to Greece in Operation Lustre and others to Egypt to refit. Some commanders appointed by Wavell to Cyrenaica Command (CYRCOM) failed to live up to expectations and Wavell relied on maps that were found to be inaccurate, when he later arrived to see for himself. In 1949, Wavell wrote, "I had certainly not budgeted for Rommel after my experience of the Italians. I should have been more prudent...".