Back اقتراع تراتبي Arabic Преференциално гласуване Bulgarian Pořadové volby Czech Pleidleisio ffafriol CY Präferenzwahl German Ψήφος με σειρά προτίμησης Greek Voto por orden de preferencia Spanish نظام انتخاباتی ترجیحی FA Painotettu vaalitapa Finnish Vote préférentiel French
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Ranked voting is any voting system that uses voters' rankings of candidates to choose a single winner or multiple winners. More formally, a ranked system is one that depends only on which of two candidates is preferred by a voter, and as such does not incorporate any information about intensity of preferences. Ranked voting systems vary dramatically in how preferences are tabulated and counted, which gives them very different properties. In instant-runoff voting (IRV) and the single transferable vote system (STV), lower preferences are used as contingencies (back-up preferences) and are only applied when all higher-ranked preferences on a ballot have been eliminated or when one of the higher ranked preferences has been elected and surplus votes need to be transferred.
Some ranked vote systems use ranks as weights; this type of system is called positional voting. In the Borda method, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd... candidates on each ballot receive 1, 2, 3... points, and the candidate with the fewest points is elected. Thus intensity of preference is assumed to be at ratios of 1 to 2, 2 to 3, etc. Although not typically described as such, the well-known plurality rule can be seen as a ranked voting system where a voter gives a single point to the candidate marked as their choice and zero points to all others, and the candidate with the most points is elected. Taking the ranked ballots of instant-runoff voting and the single transferable vote system as indicating one choice at a time (that is, giving one point to the preference in use and zero points to all others), instant-runoff voting can be seen as a non-degenerate ranked voting systems. It operates as a staged variant of the plurality system that repeatedly eliminate last-place plurality winners if necessary to determine a majority winner.[1]
In the United States and Australia, the terms ranked-choice voting and preferential voting, respectively, almost always refer to instant-runoff voting; however, because these terms have also been used to mean ranked systems in general, many social choice theorists recommend the use of instant-runoff voting in contexts where it could cause confusion. Ranked voting systems, such as Borda count, are usually contrasted with rated voting methods, which allow voters to indicate how strongly they support different candidates (e.g. on a scale from 0 to 10).[2] Ranked vote systems produce more information than X voting systems such as first-past-the-post voting. Rated voting systems produce more information than ordinal ballots; as a result, they are not subject to many of the problems with weighted rank voting (including results like Arrow's theorem).[3][4][5]
- ^ "Bill Status H.424: An act relating to town, city, and village elections for single-seat offices using ranked-choice voting". legislature.vermont.gov. Retrieved 2024-03-23.
Condorcet winner. If a candidate is the winning candidate in every paired comparison, the candidate shall be declared the winner of the election.
- ^ Riker, William Harrison (1982). Liberalism against populism: a confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. Waveland Pr. pp. 29–30. ISBN 0881333670. OCLC 316034736.
Ordinal utility is a measure of preferences in terms of rank orders—that is, first, second, etc. ... Cardinal utility is a measure of preferences on a scale of cardinal numbers, such as the scale from zero to one or the scale from one to ten.
- ^ Hamlin, Aaron (2012-10-06). "Podcast 2012-10-06: Interview with Nobel Laureate Dr. Kenneth Arrow". The Center for Election Science. Archived from the original on 2023-06-05.
Dr. Arrow: Well, I’m a little inclined to think that score systems where you categorize in maybe three or four classes probably (in spite of what I said about manipulation) is probably the best.
- ^ Hamlin, Aaron (2012-10-06). "Podcast 2012-10-06: Interview with Nobel Laureate Dr. Kenneth Arrow". The Center for Election Science. Archived from the original on 2023-06-05.
Dr. Arrow: Well, I’m a little inclined to think that score systems where you categorize in maybe three or four classes (in spite of what I said about manipulation) is probably the best.[...] And some of these studies have been made. In France, [Michel] Balinski has done some studies of this kind which seem to give some support to these scoring methods.
- ^ Hamlin, Aaron (2012-10-06). "Podcast 2012-10-06: Interview with Nobel Laureate Dr. Kenneth Arrow". The Center for Election Science. Archived from the original on 2023-06-05. CES: Now, you mention that your theorem applies to preferential systems or ranking systems.Dr. Arrow: Yes.CES: But the system that you're just referring to, approval voting, falls within a class called cardinal systems. So not within ranking systems.Dr. Arrow: And as I said, that in effect implies more information.